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a b s t r a c t
Although Machine to Machine (M2M) networks allow the development of new promising applications,
the restricted resources ofmachines and devices in theM2Mnetworks bring several constraints including
energy, bandwidth, storage, and computation. Such constraints pose several challenges in the design
of M2M networks. Furthermore, some elements that contributed to the rise of M2M applications have
caused several new security threats and risks, typically due to the advancements in technology, increasing
computing power, declining hardware costs, and freely available software tools. Due to the restricted
capabilities of M2M devices, most of the recent research efforts on M2M have focused on computing,
resource management, sensing, congestion control and controlling technologies. However, there are
few studies on security aspects and there is a need to introduce the threats existing in M2M systems
and corresponding solutions. Accordingly, in this paper, after presenting an overview of potential M2M
applications, we present a survey of security threats against M2M networks and solutions to prevent or
reduce their impact. Then, we investigate security-related challenges and open research issues in M2M
networks to provide an insight for future research opportunities. Moreover, we discuss the oneM2M
standard, one of the prominent standard initiatives for more secure and smoother M2M networks and
the Internet of Things.
© 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Machine to Machine (M2M) is a term used when talking
about devices, machines, and equipment which can communicate
between each other through wired or wireless links. M2M com-
munications enable the exchange of data between typically low-
power and low-cost devices, in an autonomous way without
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human intervention [16]. An M2M communications system con-
sists of sensors, a wireless network, and a computer connected
to the Internet [16,36,62]. M2M networks consist of a number
of devices and a gateway responsible for the connection among
devices and between the M2M network and other networks. The
term M2M is often used interchangeably with the term IoT (the
Internet of Things). In recent years, M2M has found a large num-
ber of applications across many industries, including telematics,
industrial automation, remote monitoring, intelligent transporta-
tion, healthcare, security, consumer electronics, fleetmanagement,
point of sale, smart metering, smart homes, utilities, and smart
grid [32,62]. Although, it has been used in many industries, the
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpdc.2017.05.021
0743-7315/© 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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practical constraint for the wide deployment of M2M and IoT
devices is the limited IPv4 address pool, which necessitates the
use of IPv6 addresses to increase the deployment scale of such
devices.
Various communications technologies, including cellular com-
munications, such as GSM/GPRS/EDGE,WCDMA/HSPA, and CDMA,
RFID, Wi-Fi, ZigBee, WiMAX, xDSL and fiber to the x (FTTx) can be
found in M2M networks [30,32,62,69]. In M2M networks, much of
the information is delivered in the form of sparse data. Different
from traditional computer networks, data can come from sensors
and other non-IT devices and is mostly only a few kilobytes. Typ-
ically, data generated by single M2M devices is not meaningful
alone, but all generated data (by all deployed devices) can create a
complete picture of the application. Therefore, M2M applications
should not only enable M2M devices to talk to each other, but they
should also collect all generated data and interpret it.
Since M2M is an emerging research area, there is a need to
clearly identify the issues and approaches in addressing security
of M2M networks. Along with the wide deployments of M2M
networks, the types of attacks that are experienced by the service
providers and businesses are likely to change. For instance, one
of the new challenges is the need to consider physical attacks on
devices. The main M2M information security risks rarely originate
from the network. In spite of the progress made in the security
of traditional distributed systems, securing such pervasive com-
puting systems poses new challenges because of the dynamic
nature of such systems [56]. M2M security requirements are often
dependent on dynamically changing contexts such as available
resources, location, user activity, and nearby people. However,
most common threats are due to unprotected device hardware and
weak application design, as most M2M applications developed by
the industry lack for information and communications technology
expertise. Therefore, telecommunications operators and network
vendors play a key role in assisting their customers for securing
theirM2Mapplications bymeans of a number of services. Such ser-
vices include monitoring connections using keep-alive messages,
correlating location data with GPS tracking, leveraging on existing
trust provisioning chain to deploy applicative security credentials,
enabling applications to leverage on deployed authentication and
identification infrastructures, and using over the air programming
for remotemanagement for secure deployment of applications and
for firmware upgrades.
In this paper, a survey of information security threats against
M2M networks is provided. This paper mainly presents common
information security threats and vulnerabilities in M2M networks
and investigates potential solutions against these threats and
vulnerabilities. Moreover, the challenges in meeting the security
requirements of both existing and emerging M2M applications
are also presented. Finally, a brief introduction to the oneM2M
protocol is presented. OneM2M is a global organization formed in
2012 to create an interoperable and scalable standard for com-
munications of services and devices used in M2M and IoT. The
specifications developed by oneM2M provide a framework to sup-
port services and applications such as public safety, health, home
automation, smart grid, and connected car.
The rest of this paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews potential
M2M applications. A survey of security requirements for M2M
communications is presented in Section 3. Section 4 presents
potential M2M security threats and solutions to those threats. Se-
curity related challenges ofM2Mare investigated in Section 5. Cur-
rent research status is given in Section 6. Discussion on oneM2M
and open research issues are given in Section 7. Finally the paper
is concluded in Section 8.
2. Potential M2M applications
In M2M communications, remote sensors gather data and send
it wirelessly to a network, where it is next routed, often through
a public network such as the Internet, to a server. Then, data is
analyzed and acted upon according to the software application
running on the server. In the past, telemetry technology was
used for the same purpose. However, different from the telemetry
communications, M2M communications uses existing networks to
transmit data. In addition to this,M2Mcommunications represents
various improvements over telemetry systems, such as increased
sensitivity and accuracy offered by remote sensor technology, fast
computers, and software. Due to better sensors, the explosive
growth of public wireless networks, and increased computing ca-
pability, M2M communications has so many applications in many
fields. Instead of deploying high-cost dedicated networks for com-
munications, M2M generally uses existing wireless networks to
transmit telemetry for the following reason. Different from older
telemetry system which do not always rely on radio signals and
sometimes use dedicated phone lines, M2M devices do not need
high-power radio signals since cellular towers are typically spread
over a large area to provide coverage. For M2M devices, appro-
priate standardized radio technology is determined based on the
application requirements.
Regardless of its application areas, the core concept behind
M2M is to enable real-time data communications between cen-
tral management applications and remote machines/devices to
enhance the value of the remote devices for their users. While
there are many wired and wireless communications options for
M2M applications, M2M technology has become more mobile and
even smarter since the trend lies within embedded cellular M2M
via 3GPP technologies such as GSM/GPRS, UMTS/HSPA(+), and
LTE networks [1]. Because, as a transport solution, 3GPP cellular
networks offer significant advantages toM2M providers especially
in terms of deployment aspects such as global reachability and
low cost embedded modems by System on Chip (SoC). Recently,
3GPP has completed a study on optimizing LTE for machine-type
communications (MTC) in order to provide devices that are cost
competitive with existing 2G equipment [2]. However, similar to
wireless networks, 3GPP cellular networks are vulnerable against
some information security threats such as false network attacks
and tamper attacks [40].
Considering the available communications options, the number
of innovative devices and applications which can leverage the
M2M technology is endless. In recent years, M2M technology has
rapidly spread throughout a wide range of application areas, as
more reliable data can be generated and transmitted faster by
M2M networks, and energy consumption of M2M devices is low.
While the application areas of M2M technology are numerous,
most common use cases of M2M technology are found in logistics,
automotive, transportation, utilities, health, security, safety, pay-
ment, and consumer market [36,62].
3. Security requirements forM2M communications and how to
address them
In modernM2M communications networks, as in classicWSNs,
for end-to-end communications between sensors, there is a need
for assurance regarding the confidentiality, identity, integrity, au-
thentication, access control and non-repudiation of the data that are
transmitted in the network. These requirements can be met either
by the functionality of the communications protocol (e.g., use of
encryption techniques) or by external mechanisms (e.g., firewall).
The exposure of the communications to the Internet introduced
new security requirements, like availability and resilience against
attacks from external entities that should be addressed by ap-
plications in these environments. Further security requirements
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Table 1
Major security requirements for M2M communications.
Requirement Description
Confidentiality It prevents unauthorized disclosure of sensory data in transmission
from passive attackers to ensure that only authorized entities can read
these data in an M2M communications system.
Integrity It must be ensured so that illegal alteration of the sensory data can be
detected. In an M2M communications system, meeting the integrity
requirement is critical since illegal alteration may result in serious
consequences, especially in mission-critical M2M application
domains [43].
Authentication It is a prerequisite for secure M2M communications since it allows the
back-end server in the M2M application domain to corroborate the
sensory data of the M2M nodes in the M2M domain.
Access control It is the ability to limit and control access to the back-end server in the
M2M application domain. By access control, only authorized M2M
application systems are allowed to gain access to the back-end server.
Non-repudiation It guarantees that M2M nodes cannot deny the transmission after
sending data,
Availability It ensures that whenever M2M application systems access the
back-end server, the back-end server is always available.
Privacy It is highly important in some privacy-sensitive M2M communications
systems. If sensitive information is improperly used or illegally
disclosed, undesirable negative effects can be faced with.
Freshness secrecy It is important that an M2M node should not be able to read any
previously transmitted messages when it joins the network and any
future messages after it leaves the network [25].
include privacy, trust, liability, and anonymity that are demanded
for the social acceptance of the (future) applications regarding
M2M networks and communications. Finally, authorization and
data integrity are also key requirements. Table 1 lists security
requirements for M2M communications environment.
To address the security requirements listed in Table 1 and es-
tablish a secure M2M communications environment by defending
against possible security threats, a suite of security mechanisms
are needed. Generally, the security requirements in M2M com-
munications can be achieved by cryptographic techniques. For
instance, symmetric or asymmetric encryption primitives can be
used to achieve confidentiality, and digital signature and message
authentication code techniques can be used achieve the others.
Nevertheless, most security mechanisms only efficiently defend
against external attacks. If M2M nodes are compromised and
launch some internal attacks, more sophisticated security mech-
anisms are needed [43]. In the following, proposed solutions and
promising approaches that deal with the security requirements
listed in Table 1 are given.
• Identity, Authentication, Confidentiality and Integrity: It is
very important to find a way to authenticate the identity of
an entity in a heterogeneous M2M network. In centralized
approaches, the identification and authentication might
take place by the central entities in various points (to serve
scalability requirements) while in distributed approaches
each node will be responsible for such actions. In [39], the
first two-way, fully implemented authentication security
scheme for IoT is presented. This scheme is based on existing
Internet standards and RSA encryption and is designed for
use on Ipv6 over Low power Wireless Personal Area Networks
(6LoWPANs) [47]. In [63], a transmission model that man-
ages to address the security requirements for anonymity
and confidentiality in IoT is proposed, with the use of a
signature and encryption scheme. Regarding confidentiality
and integrity, in [50] the authors describe how existing key
management systems could be applied for serving modern
M2M communications, while the authors in [33] state that
no current solution can guarantee confidentiality. Recent
solutions try to address questions regarding the adaptability
of the WSNs to the environment of M2M communications
by presenting a light-weight encryption method for privacy
protection in the form of an authentication protocol [41].
Finally, in [60], a user authentication and key agreement
scheme is proposed, for WSNs and M2M communications
that enable the secure negotiation for a session key among
sensor nodes in the network. Even though several recent
solutions manage to partially address the difficulties of the
integration ofWSNswith IoT andM2Mcommunications, the
need for creation of a solution thatwill be used as a standard
still remains open.
• Access Control and Data Integrity: Access control is about
gaining permission to the content or services that is allo-
cated or provided by entities in the network. In centralized
approaches various nodes/ entities might easily identify a
central node, and then safely communicate with it since
all access permissions will be stored there. In distributed
approaches, the dynamic and heterogeneous environment
that is created in modern M2M communications amplifies
the difficulties that have to be dealt by each node. However,
once each node can control who has access to its data, then
the overall network performance will increase. To address
these difficulties, in [47], the identification of two distinct
subjects is presented: the data holders and the data collec-
tors. The former have to be able to provide specific data
to the latter which, in turn should be able to authenticate
that the origin of the data is from a legitimate data holder.
The main difficulty here lies on the fact that identification
of legitimate users, in order to provide the desired access
control, is a difficult computational procedure that requires
many resources and power from the user node. To deal with
this problem, in [44], a hierarchical access control scheme
for the layer that is responsible for the collection of infor-
mation is proposed. This scheme actually takes under con-
sideration the limited resources and computational capacity
of the nodes creating only a single key for each user/node.
In [37], an identity based system for emergency situations is
introduced that includes registration, user authentications,
and policies that determine the level of emergency and au-
thorize the access to the provided information by legitimate
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users, in time of need. Finally, in [18], a security archi-
tecture that uses a prototype query processing engine for
data streams is developed that addresses data integrity and
confidentiality issues. In summary, it can be stated that an
overall solution has not been found yet, but all the proposed
solutions manage to address certain security requirements.
At the same time, they all present one common drawback:
the need to reach a trusting entity before moving on to
request or deliver data to other network entities.
• Privacy and Anonymity: The increased number of applica-
tions that take advantage of the advanced sensor capabilities
and the development of WSNs (e.g. applications for health
monitoring, sport activities or civil protection) generate and
propagate personal data and information, increasing the
need to efficiently protect those sensitive transmitted data.
Distributed approaches manage to perform better regard-
ing privacy and data management issues, because of better
control that each entity possesses on the data it generates
and processes. In these approaches, more information is
received by thosewith the respective credentials, since they
allow creating specific access control policies and provide
only requested data. As an example, a node in a distributed
strategy might give information about its location to certi-
fied users, allowing more detailed information (i.e., exact
location instead of just announcing vastly the geographic
area where it resides) based on the user’s credentials. On
the other hand, on centralized approaches, the (central)
data provider can select to share or not certain information
streams, while the type of services that can be provided
will be limited by the variety and amount of received data.
Hybrid approaches, that combine central entities which use
distributed strategies, may allow for a negotiation of a set
of secret keys in order to increase the overall security,
anonymity and privacy but the central entity may no longer
be able to process the data just to store them.
Proposed solutions to increase privacy and anonymity on an
M2M communications include a technique derived from Informa-
tion Control Theory [31], that is proposed to tag the data, providing
several privacy properties. But, the data tagging, unfortunately, is
a heavy processing action that should be carefully integrated for
successful M2M communications. In [23], a cluster based scheme
named CASTLE (Continuously Anonymizing STreaming data via
adaptive cLustEring) is presentedwhich ensures anonymity, fresh-
ness and deals with the delay constraints on the delivery of in-
formation flaws. Another approach is presented in [67], where a
division of the traditional strategies is proposed into two different
categories: the Discretionary Access category, where the minimum
privacy risks that should be met in order to prevent any data
disclosure or theft are described, and the Limited Access category
that provides the limits for any security access to prevent or
avoid any malicious attacks. In [61], an enhanced Domain Name
System (DNS) for smart devices is proposed in order to deal with
the privacy/security risks that arise when an IoT node receives a
static domain name. In [17], a decentralized protocol for privacy-
preserving IoT applications is described. The proposed protocol
uses a multi credential system that does not allow to the different
showing of the same credential to be linked, therefore manages to
avoid the discovery of the different keys. Like before, the users are
proposed to be divided in data origins and data collectors. In [48],
to increase privacy a mutual authentication protocol with key
exchange characteristics forWSNs and RFIDs is presented that uses
a random generator on the reader’s tag and creates a unique hash
function to increase security while providing for key refresh and
key backup to reduce the risks. Finally, in [55], an assessment of the
privacy requirements for data is delivered with the introduction of
a layered architecture in IoT that estimates data availability and
quality along with the levels of security and anonymity.
To summarize, regarding privacy and anonymity, it can be
stated that the proposed solutions manage to deal partially with
the peculiarities of M2M or IoT communications environment and
open issues are still need to be efficiently addressed to achieve an
efficient and secure integration.
• Trust and Governance: Trust is very difficult to define. For
our study, trust will be divided in two dimensions: (i) trust
in interaction between the involved entities and (ii) trust
in the system by the active users. For the first definition
of trust, in centralized approaches, the uncertainty stems
from the interaction with the data providers and deals with
the freshness of information and its reliability. Furthermore,
even though central entities might hold critical information
regarding the local characteristics of the network, the co-
operation between such entities demands a level of trust
between them to exchange the data in order to be able to
update or fix any inconsistencies in values or knowledge.
While on distributed approaches, it is more difficult to find
a way to estimate trust between two entities or verify rep-
utation metrics. At the same time, second hand information
regarding those metrics can be easily disseminated from
one entity to the other, taking advantage of the network’s
functionality.
The second definition is closely related to the knowledge of
the network’s internal state, for M2M communications around the
node. In centralized approaches, all the information is not given
freely but can become available by searching storing records or by
sendingqueries. Ondistributed approaches,more time is needed to
be able to discover and query relevant data holders. But distributed
approachesmanage to perform better, regarding governance rules,
since each node can place the desired rules and build each own
access permissions, excluding unwanted participants from the
communications network. Centralized approaches do not impose
such advantage since the servers might, as well, be placed on
foreign ground where they operate.
These problems are addressed, up until now, by solutions as
in [19,20], where trust level assessment of IoT entities is delivered
by studying human guided Smart Objects, connected wirelessly
with heterogeneous characteristics and showing cooperation ca-
pabilities. The social relationships that are created at these Smart
Objects are based on characteristics like friendship, ownership
and community, while the malicious users try to damage the IoT
functionality of the communications by trust related attacks, like
self-promotion and bad or good mouthing. In [19], especially,
a dynamic, distributed trust management protocol is proposed:
when two nodes meet and complete a transaction (of any kind),
then they can rate the quality of their cooperation and, at the same
time, can exchange their views regarding other nodes that have
been seen by each other. The latter can be considered as a kind
of recommendation. Similarly, in [46] social networking concepts
are introduced in IoT, since entities in IoT can establish social
relationships, thus creating Social IoT (SIOT). The challenge in SIOT
is the building of a reputation-based trust mechanism that deals
with certain type ofmalicious behavior that aims atmisleading the
other entities, regarding the node’s trust levels. In [38,42,52,64,68],
models regarding the management of trustworthiness are pre-
sented with basis on various P2P solutions.
In [45], the authors conclude that current traditional access
control models are not suitable for dynamic, decentralized M2M
communications scenarios. In [19,46] a fuzzy approach to Trusted
Based Access Control (FTBAC) is proposed. In this approach, trust
is measured by factors like experience, knowledge and recommen-
dations. These scores are then mapped to permissions and access
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requests are mapped to credentials which are used to determine
whether access to certain data will be permitted or not. Primary
simulation results have shown that the proposed approach is flex-
ible, energy efficient and scalable. In general, it is believed that
solutions based on cryptographic protection can achieve efficient
access control by increasing the trust levels. The price that these
solutions have to pay is an increase of the overhead in time and
the amount of energy consumption. In [59], the authors point
out that the current mechanisms for trust and reputation do not
manage to offer flexible mechanisms that can adapt easily and
seamlessly to the surrounding environment. In [34], a layered
architecture is presented for trustmanagement, consisting of three
layers (sensor, core and application layer respectively), where each
layer is controlled by a separate trust management that is based
on self-organization, routing andmulti-service. To summarize, the
available solutions regarding trust and governance utilize many
different techniques. And, even though many techniques for trust
management are mature enough, a fully distributed and dynamic
approach has not yet been introduced. Especially one that could
address the inherent characteristics ofM2M communications in an
IoT environment, as stated in [66] as well.
4. Security threats in M2M networks and countermeasures
against the security threats
M2M networks consist of a number of devices with limited
resources and, possibly depending on the architecture, a more
powerful, integrated device called gateway which is responsible
for the connection among the devices and the connection between
the M2M network and external networks. An M2M network is
potentially formed bymanyM2Mnodes and aM2M gateway. Each
M2M node is a smart and flexible device equipped with some
specific sensing technology for real-time monitoring. As soon as
monitoring data are sensed, M2M nodes are expected to make de-
cision and transmit the sensory data packets to the M2M gateway
in single-hop or multi-hop patterns. After receiving the packets
from the M2M nodes, the M2M gateway manages the packets and
provides efficient paths for forwarding these packets to the remote
back-end server via wired/wireless networks.
Thanks to M2M and the expansion of wireless networks, now
remote monitoring, data acquisition and control is available to
a larger audience than previously possible. Therefore, security is
one of the most important challenges that need to be addressed
for the smooth integration of M2M networks and the Internet
of Things (IoT) in real-life scenarios. In IoT, a large number of
devices interconnect forming heterogeneous networks to transfer,
usually over the Internet, data and information. In M2M com-
munications, which is a special case of an IoT implementation,
such devices are low-power sensors that generate personal and
sensitive data, whose integrity and privacy is crucial and has to be
firmly guarded [70].
The integration of modern, low-power, cheap but extremely
powerful sensors with Wireless Sensor Networks’ (WSN) applica-
tions and the use of the Internet for the dissemination of the gen-
erated information has introduced the system to new, advanced
security threats. The reason is that, besides the threats that are
inherent to low power WSN environment characteristics and con-
straints (e.g., depletion of energy, small memory capacity, limited
processing power), in M2M networks, there are also external or
Internet originated hazards. The integration of the Internet has
exposed the network’s communications (both for the devices and
applications) to newly introduced security threats, depending on
the applied mechanism used for the integration between the tech-
nologies (i.e., the use of centralized IoT architectures or distributed
ones) [33,51,54]. Those threats are mainly motivated by the wire-
less nature of the communications and the physical exposure of
the communicating entity (sensor). In this section, we will first
classify the attackers and describe the common security threats
that can be detected in M2M communications. Then, we will focus
on the specific security and privacy threats that can be found
in M2M systems and describe how the communications system
architecture can be affected by these attacks. Finally, the security
requirements for an efficient and robust M2M communications
system are presented followed by descriptions on how to address
them.
4.1. Classification of attacks and common security threats
Before going into the details of the specific threats in M2M
communications, we will first classify the attackers as internal
or external [33]. Internal attackers are those who manage to take
control of a network node and then, participate on the commu-
nications that take place legitimately. Such attackers can easily
send/receive messages to/from the other networks’ nodes because
access to any encryption keys that are demanded for the net-
work’s communications is open to the attacker as the node’s new
owner. On the other hand, external attackers mainly ‘‘listen’’ to
the (wireless) communications, try to understand the network’s
functionality, and discover any possible vulnerability. External at-
tackers are easier to defend, since they do not hold any crucial
information (e.g., cryptographic keys for the communications) that
may damage the M2M communications.
In addition to the aforementioned classification of the attackers,
a similar classification of the types of potential attacks can be
also done as passive and active attacks [33]. In a passive attack
the attacker has no intention of generating any interaction with
a network entity. Instead, the attacker only tries to understand
the network’s functionality by observing the communications and
search for a way to break into the system silently, without been
noticed. In an active attack, on the other hand, the attacker uses
all of its resources to break into the system and disrupt its com-
munications and functionality without beenworried about getting
noticed.
Considering the above types of attacks and the behaviors of the
attackers, Table 2 lists anddescribes threats relevant to the security
domains.
The way each of the aforementioned threats may damage the
network’s communications and functionality does not only depend
on the nature of the attack or the attacker but, as it has been
mentioned earlier, might also depend on the approach for the
integration of the M2M communications [51,54].
4.2. Security vulnerabilities & threats specific to M2M networks and
countermeasures
Since most M2M applications generate and transmit sensitive
data between communicating entities/nodes, they need to be able
to provide required security services such asmutual authentication
between the communicating entities/nodes, access control, high
availability, confidentiality, and protection against data manipu-
lation. In M2M applications, security related operations must be
provided with a number of approaches and mechanisms such as
secure storage of sensitive data, sensitive functions, such as cryp-
tographic algorithms, key derivation functions and hash functions,
performing operations on sensitive data, and secure connection to
allow the secure transmission of sensitive datawith an appropriate
level of confidence in order to implement security features and
countermeasures against potential threats [3,58]. Regardless of
where the provision of security services is realized, the ability to
establish security associations (SAs) between corresponding M2M
nodes is required [3].
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Table 2
Summary of common threats related to security domains.
Attack Classification Definition / Description
Eavesdropping Passive, external A passive and external attack in which the attacker targets various
diverse communications channels (e.g., wireless networks, Internet)
and listens to the disseminating data, even recording or cloning it, in
an effort to learn things about the network and possibly manages to
find a way inside it (becoming therefore an internal attacker when
access is achieved). The probability of this network attack has
increased due to the Internet-based communications in a M2M
communications network.
Man in the Middle Active, external An active and external attack, where the attacker first uses
eavesdropping to learn about the communications keys used by two
peers and, then, impersonates one part to the other by manipulating
messages and their flow, controlling fully the conducted
communications. Man in the Middle (MITM) attack is a common
network attack that is influenced by the Internet-based
communications.
Node Capture Active, external Instead of intercepting the communications or trying to find a hole on
the network security, an active external attacker might try to
(manually) take control of a device and then extract any information
from it, instead of destroying it.
Spoofing Active, internal/external An active internal or external attack, in which the attacker
impersonates a legitimate user or network node in order to gain access
and launch other attacks against critical nodes in the network such as
spreading malware by bypassing access controls, and hence damaging
the network’s functionality.
Denial of Service (DoS) Active, external/internal DoS attacks target the network operation and aim to decrease
network’s functionality or even shut it down for a small time period.
When a DoS attack takes place, a malicious user aims to exhaust the
network’s resources by continuously keeping the network traffic high
and, eventually, preventing legitimate users from using the network.
This is a very common and dangerous attack in the M2M environment,
where exhaustion of the sensors’ energy is crucial for the network’s
survival. The physical compromise and destruction of a node can also
be considered as a DoS attack, since the results remains the same: the
destruction of the network’s operation. The following attacks can be
categorized under DoS attacks.
• Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS): In a DDoS attack, continuous
flooding for requests from multiple malicious nodes damages the
network’s operation and disrupts any communications. Such flooding
requests might be targeting different layers of the protocol stack,
creating a different kind of attack that needs to be carefully addressed.
For example, the DDoS attack that disrupts the wireless
communications by jamming the signal via sending bogus data and
requests is considered as an attack at the physical layer. At the MAC
(Medium Access Control) layer, a DDoS attack involves the malicious
nodes sending packets at the same time as a legitimate node, resulting
in packet collisions and decreased network performance [33].
• Fuzzing: In this attack, the attacker’s goal is to cause a device or
application to fail by using randomly generated or manipulated
messages. Attackers can insert specific exploits into messages
including buffer overflows, special format characters or invalid input
data to find implementation errors on a device application or service.
Routing Protocol Attacks Active, external They affect the routing decisions on the communications path and can
target all the modern routing protocols. Examples of such attacks
include:
• Sybil attacks: In Sybil attacks, a node manages to create many fake
identities and affect the communications performance.
• Wormhole attacks: In wormhole attacks, the attacker records packets
transmitted somewhere on the network and then tunnels them in a
different area where they are retransmitted.
Injection Active, internal/external This attack relies on injecting malicious data into an application
through its communications interfaces in order to execute, interpret,
or parse in an unexpected manner. When untrusted data is sent to an
interpreter as part of a SQL, LDAP, XPath or OS command/query, this
data can cause executing unintended commands or gaining access to
unauthorized data.
The results of an attack on the communications might highly
depend on the architecture of the system since the vulnerabilities
will highly vary. To this end, the results of an attack on a centralized
architecture, that uses application platforms located somewhere
in the cloud to gather data from various scattered entities, will
be different from when a similar attack is launched against a
distributed architecture, where all the entities have the ability to
retrieve, provide, and process information and data. Variations
on the deployment strategies, the flaw of information, and the
availability of services are the main reasons for this difference on
the expected results. On centralized approaches, the attacker will
aim for the target that cause the largest damage to the network
148 G. Tuna et al. / J. Parallel Distrib. Comput. 109 (2017) 142–154
and any central entity falls into this category. Such entities will
be heavily guarded but, in the case where the attack succeeds, the
networkwill be seriously damaged. On distributed approaches, the
information is generated and processed in many different entities,
and hence the attacker will have to increase its efforts in order
to cause the same damage as the one caused by breaching into
a central entity, increasing the difficulty for the success of the
attack. On the other hand, on distributed approaches the entities
will not be as heavily guarded as a central entity would, making it
easier to fall under a malicious attack. Furthermore, if the attacker
selectively gains control of certain entities that possess a specific
piece of information, then the result can be very devastating for
the network’s performance. Another aspect of an attack on a cen-
tralized approach is the flow of information. On such approaches,
information flows from every ‘thing’ to the central entity, follow-
ing a relatively hierarchical route. On distributed approaches, the
information flow takes place inconsistently, when it is needed,
resembling the functionality of a peer-to-peer (P2P) system. There-
fore, the capture of the flow will not reveal any comprehensive
data regarding the structure or operation of the network but, at
the same time, the attacker will have processed information and
not raw data. Finally, regarding the connectivity of the network,
approaches that use super nodes or central entities would require
that the addresses of these entities are well-known in the net-
work and that they can accept external connections making them
susceptible to any malicious attacks. Those strategies would need
further security solutions and protection mechanisms to be able
to control those incoming connections, such as additional middle-
ware layers and firewalls. Regarding the suitability of an approach
to defend against a security threat in M2M communications, no
single solution stands out. Centralized approaches provide better
defense at the central entity but, if successful, the attack can deeply
wound the network’s functionality. On the other hand, a successful
attack on a distributed approach has smaller effect, but entities are
scattered at various locations increasing the number of probable
attacks that might have to deal with (e.g., node capture or DoS
attack).
In general, an attacker will aim to take under control infor-
mation that relates to authentication and encryption of the data
that is transmitted in M2M communications either to read and/or
modify this information and to jam the communications and/or
to allow the impersonation of a legal network party in the M2M
communications network. Common techniques that are used to
achieve these results are hacking of a legal user or eavesdropping
of the communications. Table 3 lists the potential threats and
proposes countermeasures in an effort to address them.
In summary, although M2M networks share the same classic
threats existing in other technologies or networks, in M2M net-
works, most of the threats are a combination of security risks
originated by the inherent characteristics of lowpower devices and
applications, augmented by the risks that are originated from their
integration with external communications and the Internet. The
heterogeneity of the networks that are combined to create a M2M
network and the huge number of interconnected devices amplifies
the dangers and the needs to propose novel secure mechanisms
for the communications in an effort to increase the resiliency and
efficiency in the system’s communications performance.
5. Research challenges
Autonomous operation is highly desirable in almost all environ-
ments. Then, the more the machines can operate autonomously,
the more work they can do without human intervention. On the
other hand, possibly in the future, humans will still need to be in
the chain to oversee the different operational processes, but they
will act as direct supervisors. Therefore, the humans will only be
responsible for taking a step if a machine reports a problem. So the
humans will be ‘‘the weakest link in the chain’’. Therefore, novel
management frameworks are needed to reduce the complexity
of managing a huge number of M2M devices, especially in the
industry [22].
Telemetry systems installed in thepastwerenot designed infor-
mation security in mind. Because the designers did not expect that
those systemswill be connected to a public access network like the
Internet. Similarly, traditional M2M applications have been typi-
cally focused and used specific edge devices, a single network and
custom platform. Therefore, securing them to the acceptable level
has been relatively easy for information security professionals.
However, the transition toM2Mwas quick and the designers again
generally failed to address information-security related concerns.
In addition, although someM2Mdevices do not support IP protocol
for communications, most M2M devices inherently support IP and
run embedded andhighly vulnerable operating systems. Therefore,
in addition to guaranteeing the integrity of data received from the
M2M devices, firmware upgrades must be authenticated to ensure
nomalware is introduced to the embedded operating systems [33].
M2M designers always should keep in mind that the key in
information security is to prevent threats and vulnerabilities not
to cure them. It is expected that number of attacks on M2M sys-
tems will increase. Hence, M2M device suppliers should offer their
customers simple and cost effectivemeasures to enable them have
secure M2M designs and accordingly M2M application owners
should use proper consulting to secure their M2M networks and
devices [33,54]. In fact, every part of the M2M chain must be
protected, including protection of the M2M networks and M2M
devices themselves, the securing of physical and logical access
credentials, protection of the communications among the M2M
devices, and securing of the M2M applications themselves and of
the portals used for access.
Although standards bodies all around the world develop new
information security standards, most of the standards generally
are either too strong, and hence hard to adopt, or too weak, and
hence incomplete. Whether the standards are strong or weak, the
key point is implementation. In addition, it is well-known that
there has never been a security standard which has obviated all
information security concerns. Even if there such a theory exists,
its efficiency will still be questionable since what works in theory
is not always practical to implement. Therefore, the designers
should see the whole picture in order to successfully satisfy the
risk requirements of their potential customers [4].
Most information security architects use data encryption to
protect sensitive digital information and comply with legislative
mandates and regulatory standards related to data privacy pro-
tection. In addition, in terms of implementation, there may be
country-specific regulatory guidelines to be addressed. For in-
stance, in the US, the National Institute for Science and Technology
(NIST) has been creating rules by which M2M must play [5]. Al-
though the use of data encryption is an effectivemeans of enforcing
security policies governing the confidentiality of sensitive data,
encrypting information is a processor-intensive task and thusM2M
devices may need to be selective as to what they encrypt as they
have to minimize power usage. Battery lifetime is one of the main
challenges and if an M2M device deals with encryption activity all
the time, soon it will not have any power to do anything.
Most of commercial M2M platforms are scalable and compre-
hensive in features, but they comewith high licensing fee and high
total cost of ownership. Therefore, commercial M2M platforms
involve significant risks for enterprises and telecommunications
operators who wish to invest in M2M and are unsuitable for inno-
vation and early stage exploratory activities in which novel M2M
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Table 3
Security threats in M2M networks and countermeasures/solutions [3,43,58].
Description of threats Possible consequences Countermeasures/solutions
Hacking of Long-Term Service-Layer (LTSL)
keys stored in M2M devices/gateways.
M2M devices/gateways may be
impersonated using the LTSL keys.
• To address this treat, one of the solutions is to store M2M LTSL keys
in a Hardware Security Module (HSM), typically certified for being
tamper-resistance, which resides within the M2M device/gateway, and
this way makes it impossible for attackers to discover the values of
LTSL keys.
• Session keys with a predetermined limited lifetime set by an M2M
security policy can be used.
Hacking and modification of LTSL keys
stored in M2M devices/gateways.
A DoS attack may be realized to prevent
proper operation of the M2M solution.
• To address this treat, one of the solutions is to store M2M LTSL keys
in a HSM, typically certified for being tamper-resistance, which resides
within the M2M device/gateway, and this way makes it impossible for
attackers to discover the values of LTSL keys.
• Allowing the modification of stored sensitive data and LTSL keys is
done after a strong cryptographic authentication and authorization.
Hacking and replacement of LTSL keys
stored in M2M devices/gateways.
The M2M solution may be operated
illegitimately and users cannot be made
accountable for realized activities.
• To address this treat, one of the solutions is to store M2M LTSL keys
in a HSM, typically certified for being tamper-resistance, which resides
within the M2M device/gateway, and this way makes it impossible for
attackers to discover the values of LTSL keys.
• Allowing the access and modification of stored sensitive data and
LTSL keys is done after a strong cryptographic authentication and
authorization.
Hacking of LTSL keys stored in M2M
infrastructure equipment, such as security
server or equipment holding network
Common Service Entity (CSE), are
discovered by means of various techniques
including the reading the contents of
memory locations, monitoring of internal
processes and illegal/unauthorized use of
management interfaces used for
illegal/unauthorized purposes.
The LTSL keys may be used to impersonate
M2M infrastructure equipment.
• M2M LTSL keys can be stored in a tamper-resistance certified HSM,
which resides within the M2M infrastructure equipment to make it
impossible for attackers to discover the value of LTSL keys. To make the
M2M system even more secure, HSM/server-HSM are configured not
to reveal the values of the stored keys to the M2Mmanagement
system and M2M system operators.
• Session keys with a predetermined limited lifetime set by an M2M
security policy can be used.
Deletion of LTSL keys stored in the M2M
infrastructure equipment by means of
management commands.
Proper operation of the M2M solution may
be prevented and a DoS attack may be
realized.
• M2M LTSL keys can be stored in a tamper-resistance certified HSM,
which resides within the M2M infrastructure equipment to make it
impossible for the attacker to discover the value of LTSL keys.
• Allowing the access and modification of stored sensitive data and
LTSL keys is done after a strong cryptographic authentication and
authorization.
Sniffing of sensitive data while used during
the execution of sensitive functions in
M2M devices/gateways.
Copied sensitive data may be used to
compromise security of the M2M solution.
• Executing sensitive functions which may be executed within an HSM
prevents LTSL keys from being exposed outside the HSM.
Eavesdropping of M2M Service Layer (SL)
messaging between entities.
Privacy of the users may be lost and the
M2M Service Provider (SP) can be blamed.
• Use of secure communications link and SA between communicating
entities/nodes by means of modern cryptographic algorithms.
Modifications of M2M SL messaging
between entities.
Loss of revenue may happen as the attacker
may defraud the M2M SP and a large-scale
attack can be realized.
• An SA is established between the communicating M2M entities to
provide mutual authentication, confidentiality, and integrity. The SA
relies on protocols proven to resist MITM attacks.
• Session keys with a predetermined limited lifetime set by an M2M
security policy can be used.
M2M SL messaging between entities is
replayed.
Loss of revenue may happen as the attacker
may defraud the M2M SP and a large-scale
attack can be realized.
• To detect whether a part or all of a message is an unauthorized
repeat of a part or all of earlier message functionality can be provided
by the protocol suite.
• Session keys with a predetermined limited lifetime set by an M2M
security policy can be used.
• Use of secure communications link and SA between communicating
entities/nodes by means of modern cryptographic algorithms.
Hacking and installation of unauthorized or
corrupted M2M SL software in M2M
devices/gateways by an attacker.
This type of attacks may be used to commit
fraud, cause a breach of privacy, reveal
sensitive data, and prevent operation of the
M2M devices/gateways.
• Verification of the integrity of executable files and functions in M2M
devices/gateways should be done. This way if a file or function fails the
integrity verification test, its use can be prevented by means of
policy-based actions.
Possible interdependence of underlying
M2M systems and resources
Although M2M gateways and M2M
endpoints are typically dedicated to
specific services, M2M systems frequently
share resources with a number of other
unrelated systems and applications. Hence,
such attacks may cause threats for many
interdependent services.
• Inventory of the assets of an M2M solution should be prepared and
shared M2M assets should be identified. In addition, sensitivity
assessment of shared M2M assets can be carried out for management
review. Based on the asset inventory and sensitivity assessment, a risk
assessment should be carried out to make recommendations for the
management to treat, transfer or accept risks related to
interdependency.
Lack of context awareness solutions for
M2M and this may exhaust available
resources and trigger M2M service impacts
or outages.
Although the level of security is sufficient
on the context of the M2M operation, its
static management may result in inefficient
usage of available system resources.
• Inventory of the different operational contexts of an M2M solution
should be prepared and assessment for sensitivity to confidentiality,
integrity, and availability requirements should be carried out. Based on
the operational context inventory and sensitivity assessment, a risk
assessment should be carried out to determine if risks differ across the
operational contexts.
(continued on next page)
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Table 3 (continued)
Eavesdropping of sensitive information at
the Transport layer.
This type of attacks may cause numerous
threats to the M2M solution.
• This type of attacks typically depends on exploiting the lack of
security protection during data transmission or vulnerabilities in the
protocol protecting the communications channel.
• Use of secure communications link and SA between communicating
entities/nodes by means of modern cryptographic algorithms.
Unauthorized possession of viable keys and
credentials is gained and the keys and
credentials are removed from the
legitimate M2M device by an attacker.
The removed keys and credentials are used
in unauthorized M2M devices so that the
legitimate M2M user is charged. In
addition, a service request of the legitimate
user may be denied while the unauthorized
device is online.
• M2M LTSL keys can be stored in a tamper-resistance certified HSM
bounded to the M2M device/gateway to make it impossible for the
attacker to discover the value of LTSL keys.
Buffer overflows are present when the use
of non-type safe Application Programming
Interface (API)’s are exposed and they are
special cases of the violation of memory
safety.
Buffer overflows are indicated by the
return code which jumps to a random
location, and hence incorrect code is
executed and this may change local data.
• Implementing secure coding practices which enforce strict input
data validation in M2M system, services, and applications.
Untrusted data sent to a query interpreter
can cause injection flaws which are often
found in program arguments, OS
commands, SQL queries, LDAP queries, and
XPath queries.
The attacker sends inappropriate queries to
the application-level server and by
exploiting security vulnerabilities of the
query interpreter gains unauthorized
access to the server.
• Untrusted data should be kept separate from queries and commands.
• Parameterized APIs should be preferred and specific escape syntax
should be used for the interpreter.
• Examination of vulnerable code makes it easy to discover and resolve
injection flaws.
Custom authentication and session
schemes often have flaws which can be
used by attackers and malicious users.
By exploiting flaws or leaks in the
authentication or session management
functions, the attacker impersonates
legitimate M2M users.
• Strong session management and security controls should be in place.
• Implementing secure coding practices which enforce strict input
data validation in M2M system, services, and applications.
Due to security misconfiguration, attackers
gain unauthorized access to or knowledge
of the M2M system by accessing default
user accounts, unpatched flaws,
unprotected files and directories, and
unused pages.
The attackers and malicious M2M users
may compromise the M2M System.
• Good separation and high security between M2M application
components should be provided.
Not encrypting sensitive data is one of the
most important flaws. Even encryption is
employed; other flaws such as weak
algorithms, unsafe key generation and
storage, weak hashes to protect passwords,
and not rotating keys can be used by
attackers and malicious users.
Since their limited access, attackers have
difficulty in detecting the flaws; hence they
generally exploit other flaws and tools,
such as finding keys, getting clear text
copies of data, or accessing data via
channels automatically decrypting, to gain
the needed access.
• Appropriate strong algorithms and strong keys should be used, and
key management protocols should be in place.
Invalid input data by means of injecting
specific exploits, SQL injection attacks,
buffer overflows, and cross-site scripting
can be used to gain control over vulnerable
machines.
The attacker may access unintended
functionality, execute remote code, steal
data, escalate privileges, bypass
authentication, and realize a DoS attack.
• Input data validation should be used to ensure that the content
provided to an M2M application does not allow accessing to
unintended functionalities or privilege escalation.
• Least-privileges should be implemented to minimize M2M service
privileges and reduce associated risks.
Code is injected into Web pages generated
by a vulnerable Web application.
This attack is called cross-site scripting and
takes advantage of Web servers which
return dynamically generated pages or
allow their users to post viewable content
to run HTML, ActiveX, JavaScript and
VBScript on remote machines browsing the
sites within the context of client–server
sessions.
• Positive input validation which decodes any input to validate its
length, characters and format before accepting it should be in place to
protect against cross scripting attacks.
Outdated software that could not be
upgraded.
The system is vulnerable to external
attacks that can take advantage of the
outdated code to provide access to a node
and, then, the whole system.
• The sensors are deployed in hazardous location where their
replacement or upgrade is not possible.
• Replace these sensors with updated solutions.
ideas and applications need to be quickly prototyped, field tested
for technical and business feasibility.
Although the philosophy behind M2M is not something com-
pletely new for those familiar with embedded control and moni-
toring,when potentialM2Muse cases have been taken into consid-
eration, M2M offers significant market potential [62]. On the other
hand, different from the requirements of existing M2M solutions,
it is expected that M2M plug and play (PNP) capability will be es-
sential for the success and overall acceptance ofM2M technologies
for future M2M solutions. In addition, the designers may need to
design their products so as to enable them to support a mixture
of new and legacy devices and services [62]. In this respect, M2M
gateways and aggregation points are expected to play key roles by
providing interworking with different wireless technologies and
bringing the sensors with short-range radios online.
6. Current research status
After discussing the research challenges in M2M communica-
tions networks, a discussion about the current research status will
take place focusing on how the solutions that are under consider-
ation and examination, try to deal with the security requirements
in M2M communications.
As described above, the heterogeneity of the devices that com-
municate in an IoT environment plays a very important role in
the M2M communications, mainly due to the variation in the
available computation capabilities of the included sensors along
with limitations in the lifetime due to energy depletion. Lately, in
order to address those problems, several solutions that propose
energy harvesting have been examined [53] taking advantage of
renewable energy resources (e.g., sun, wind) in an effort to extend
the lifetime of a sensor. When these solutions are combined with
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efforts in introducing new lightweight protocols for symmetric and
asymmetric encryption [28,65], an increased security performance
of the system can be achieved. Identification, authorization and
trust are, also, consider as important security requirements in
M2M communications, as stated in Section 3, and current research
status in this area aims to provide the required conditions for
two different devices to build a trust relationship and enhance
all the existing identification and authorization solutions. To this
end, the design of a secure identifier is examined in [21] where
the use of IEEE 802.1AR [35] or other cryptographically gener-
ated identifiers [6,49,57] is proposed and examined. At the same
time, the use of a secure boot for local trust validation will be
of great importance on establishing a trusted environment from
where various trust validation processes can begin. For example,
autonomous validation with the use of smart cards that possess
authentication secrets is examined but an important disadvantage
is the need to create costly replacements for the existing solutions.
On the other hand, the use of remote validation inherits many
problems from M2M environments showing scalability and com-
plexity limitations due to the heterogeneity of M2M communi-
cations, while semiautonomous validation [24] is currently under
study to test whether it can address the limitations of the others.
Semiautonomous validation combines local and remote validation
techniques in an effort to establish communications in situations
of danger or necessity. The use of distributed mechanisms for
semiautonomous validation is under study to test whether they
can increase the system’s performance.
Anonymity and liability are two other topics that will, not only,
highly influence the security of a M2M communications system,
but will also influence the societal acceptance of such a system.
Very frequently, in modern M2M or IoT networks the data that are
transmitted through themobile phones or the sensors are personal
and sensitive to be overseen by others. Therefore, techniques that
propose data transformation or randomization are under study,
in an effort to anonymize the content for a possible intruder.
Especially, models like k-anonymity [57] are examined as to how
efficient they can be proved for anonymizing the data in M2M
communications. Liability affects security when third-parties de-
mand access to data that have been gathered by sensors to analyze
and process. Techniques that ensure that an explicit statement
about the use of these data is issued along with assurance that
they will not be disseminated to others need to be examined and
tested. Finally, the lack of standards has been already pointed
out as a possible security hole for M2M communications. To this
end, Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) organized a group to
work on 6LoWPAN [47] and emphasize on proposing new stan-
dards for communications in low-energy area networks, where
mostM2Mcommunications do belong. In addition, differentwork-
ing groups have been formed, like Routing Over Low power and
Lossy networks (ROLL) [7] and Constrained RESTful Environments
(CoRE) [15] which are such examples in an effort to provide the
needed standards that will enhance the communications between
two devices that will take place autonomously and efficiently.
Finally, in [21] a novel architecture is described that can highly in-
crease the efficiency of theM2Mcommunications,while allowing a
better control of their security by providingM2M service bootstrap
and key hierarchy for authentication and authorization, alongwith
mutual agreement for the key of the communications.
7. Open research issues and discussion on oneM2M
While, in recent years, considerable research efforts have been
directed toM2M communications, there aremany open issues that
need to be addressed. In this sectionwe focus on the open research
issues on security threats in M2M networks and discuss oneM2M
standards initiative.
7.1. Open research issues
In future M2M applications, wireless communications will be
fundamental as sensing and actuating devices are expected to be
able to autonomously communicate without any human interven-
tion. Because M2M devices with wireless communications capa-
bilities allow the users of M2M applications to transparently in-
teract with their physical surroundings. However, interoperability
issues between M2M devices following different standards from
different vendors create significant challenges for the developers
of M2M applications. Therefore, novel approaches are necessary
to define how M2M devices and applications with heterogeneous
characteristics communicate autonomously at the various protocol
layers and how information security can be enabled for wireless
communications. Besides them, a flexible and scalable M2M mid-
dleware can be used to integrate a wide variety of M2M devices
following diverse protocols and standards.
It is expected that the model for M2M in the future will elim-
inate the use of a central hub which accepts wired and/or wired
signals from connectedM2Mdevices, and insteadwill have devices
which communicate with each other and work out problems on
their own. However, such decentralization will lead to situations
where highly resource-constrained M2M nodes will have to con-
nect and send data to powerful remote servers in addition to
playing an active role in providing information security. In this
respect, due to the technological gap between these classes of
devices, collaborative management approaches are essential.
Different from traditional telemetry systems, due to the
tremendous increase in data volume from a large number of M2M
devices, network traffic and load on the M2M infrastructure has
increased severely. Accordingly, storage space and throughput on
the M2M infrastructure and network have increased. This makes
it necessary to develop strategies for scalable M2M infrastructures
and networks. On the other hand, the use of intelligent gateway
devices can help in addressing the issues of M2M network traffic
and data volumes up to a level.
In the future, it is expected that M2M devices will play a key
role in security-critical applications. However, most M2M devices
are seriously constrained in terms of energy, memory, and com-
putational capability. Hence, these limitations must be considered
for the security of M2M wireless communications and existing
security mechanisms may not be appropriate for M2M wireless
communications. In fact, the heterogeneity and the particular char-
acteristics of M2M devices are currently motivating the design of
a set of communications protocols at the various communications
layers.
7.2. oneM2M
OneM2M is a standards initiative to address the need for a
common M2M service layer (SL) which can be embedded within
hardware and software, and relied upon to connect a large number
of devices in the field with M2M application servers by developing
technical specifications [8,9]. The key objective of oneM2M is to
involve organizations from M2M-related business domains and
then prepare, approve and maintain the necessary set of techni-
cal specifications. OneM2M is developed to define a number of
requirements and specifications including the followings [29,58]:
1. The requirements and use cases for a common set of SL
capabilities;
2. SL aspects with high-level and detailed service architecture;
3. SL and communications functions;
4. Identification and naming of applications and devices;
5. Open interfaces and protocols;
6. Security and privacy aspects;
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Fig. 1. Overview of the oneM2M security context [3].
7. Discovery and reachability of applications;
8. Interoperability standards;
9. Information models and data management;
10. Collection of data for billing and statistical purposes.
It is expected that framework developments and their adap-
tion processes should be in accordance with the ETSI M2M and
oneM2M architecture recommendations. In [27] the integration of
a user centric IoT application with the standardized referenced ar-
chitectures is shown. Due to the limitations and application related
constraints, it may be necessary to efficiently manage both smart
and legacy devices, an important feature for loT ecosystems. In this
respect, utilization of CoRE Link [10] can settle the heterogeneity
of the managed devices and promote interoperability [26].
Basically, from information security point of view, oneM2M is a
good step to face the challenges of M2M security and privacy and
will be the key to the sustainable development of both M2M and
IoT applications. Because the security architecture of oneM2M is
based on the following components and features [11]:




• Sensitive Data Handling;
• Security Administration.
In oneM2M security context, three entities are described [3]
(see Fig. 1). The first, Network Service Entity (NSE) can be consist
of several different kinds of communications infrastructure such as
GSM/GPRS/EDGE, WCDMA/HSPA and CDMA, RFID, Wi-Fi, ZigBee,
6LowPAN, WiMAX, xDSL and FTTx. On the top of NSE, Common
Service Functions (CSFs) reside in the entity called Common Ser-
vices Entity (CSE). CSFs handle the fundamental roles such as
communications, data, and device management, security, service
charging, subscriptions and notifications, etc. In oneM2M specifi-
cations, CSEs are located in three types of nodes (i.e. Middle Node,
Application Service Node, and Infrastructure Node) each having
one and only CSE [14]. CSEs collaborate in a distributed fashion
for the system-wide operation. These services are used by the
Application Entities (AEs) [10].
Related with these entities four security domains can be identi-
fied; (i) Application Domain Security is responsible for the secure
exchange of messages between applications; (ii) Intra Common
Services Domain Security is the set of security measures for the
secure communications between CSFs located in CSE; (iii) Inter
Common Services Domain Security is the set of features that enable
secure exchange of messages between CSEs in different nodes;
and finally, (iv) Underlying Network Security Domain concerns
securely exchange of messages between underlying network and
common services.
Regarding (iv), before any oneM2M CSFs can take place, con-
nectivity has to be established in the underlying network, which
may involve independent provisioning and service registration
procedures. For the security concerns at (iii) service layer security
provisioning and association establishment procedures results in a
TLS or DTLS session which protects messages being exchanged be-
tween adjacent AEs and CSEs [12]. Furthermore, AEs that need spe-
cial privacy requirements against untrusted intermediate nodes
may form a secure link through provisioning and association in
order to encrypt the application related content. The internal func-
tionality of CSE can also cause security gaps as a part of intra
common services domain security (ii) for instance, possession of a
set of viable keys and credentials can allow an unauthorized M2M
device to cause denial of service attacks, buffer overflows, man-in-
the-middle attacks or consume service rights of a legitimate M2M
User.
Security services of oneM2M is organized into six different
functions namely; identification and authentication, authorization,
identity management, security association, sensitive data han-
dling, security administration. Identification step can be described
as the process of checking if the identity required to authenticate
is valid or not. After that, authentication process can take place
which validates if the identity has a trustworthy credential. In the
specifications, provisioned symmetric key or certificated-based
methods canbeused as the authenticationprocedure. Furthermore
it is allowed to use a centralized key distribution server which
can be hosted by a 3rd party or by M2M Service Provider. De-
vices in the field domain can access this key distribution server
using a symmetric key (M2M Authentication Function Security
Association Establishment Framework). Authorization regulates
the accesses to the services and data. Access control can be done
by using a control list or role/attribute based methods. For the role
based access control, a token based framework called OAuth has
been mentioned in the specifications as an example [13]. Role or
attribute based access is more scalable than user-based control
lists and can greatly reduce the cost and administrative overhead.
For the purpose of anonymity, identity management functional-
ity of security services in oneM2M, provides pseudonyms which
serve as temporary identifiers that cannot be linked to the true
identity [14]. Security association can only be performed after
successful identification and mutual authentication of the cor-
responding M2M entities. Association provides security services
to the communicating entities, such as confidentiality and/or in-
tegrity of information exchange though the use of derived keys as
a result of this procedure. In the security architecture of oneM2M,
isolated secure environments can be created. Inside these secure
environments sensitive functions and data can be stored. Secure
environment abstraction layer provides physical or logical con-
nectivity to the secure environments in order to store/retrieve
data such as credentials, subscriptions, personal information or
functions including security algorithms. In such a way different
applications/functions can concurrently operate inside a node in
a securely isolated manner. Finally security administration can be
described as the set of functions to manage the security functions,
resources, attributes and the resources provided by the secure
environment.
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8. Conclusion
AlthoughM2M offers many benefits tomany types of industrial
or non-industrial applications, the devices’ limited resources bring
several constraints and hence create design-related challenges.
Moreover, although the underlying principle of M2M is not new
and a similar technology has been used for a long time for supervi-
sory control and data acquisition purposes, neither the technology
itself nor most of M2M devices were designed with security in
mind as the designers did not expect that the M2M devices would
be connected to a public access network such as Internet. However,
different from the designer’s original assumption, most M2M de-
vices are not now behind a secure network.
In this paper, we first present typical network security threats
in M2M networks and potential solutions to reduce their effects
or prevent them. Then, we investigate the challenges and open
research issues in M2M security. As given in the paper, the iden-
tification and application of appropriate security measures must
be taken into consideration at the beginning of design and devel-
opment phases. If M2M designers consider an overall integrated
security approach, they can ensure end-to-end security in M2M
implementations. Importantly, in addition to playing a key role
in the sustainable development of M2M applications, oneM2M
handles security. As confidence in the security and privacy of data
will be a key factor in the successful take-up of M2M and IoT
services, oneM2M specifications should be integrated into M2M
development lifecycles.
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